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V

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20150284-CA
ROMEO LUCERO OLIYAREZ,
Appellant is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103 (2)(e). See Addendum A
(Change of Plea, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.85-86.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant
for failing to signal for two seconds prior to each lane change in a two lane change
scenario when defendant complied with Utah's lane change law that simply requires a
driver to initiate a signal prior to the beginning of a vehicle's movement?
Standard ofReview: "[T]he factual findings supporting the trial court's decision
that the stop and search were conducted in a constitutionally permissible manner are
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, while the ultimate legal determination
that the stop and search comported with the Fourth Amendment is reviewed for
correctness." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Preservation: This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to
Suppress Hearing held on December 9, 2013. R. 35-46, 138-172. This issue was also
preserved through a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of defendant's
Motion to Suppress. See Utah R.Crim.P. 11 (j); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39
(Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Issue II: Whether the officer lacked justification to impound the vehicle, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when the vehicle was not unlawfully parked nor
causing a traffic hazard, when the defendant was able to contact the owner of the vehicle
to take quick custody of the vehicle, but was not given the opportunity to do so, and when
the officer failed to comply with standardized impound procedures?
Standard ofReview: "[T]he factual findings supporting the trial court's decision
that the stop and search were conducted in a constitutionally permissible manner are
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, while the ultimate legal determination
that the stop and search comported with the Fourth Amendment is reviewed for
correctness." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Preservation: This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to
Suppress Hearing held on December 9, 2013. R. 35-46, 138-172. This issue is also
preserved through a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of defendant's
Motion to Suppress. See Utah R.Crim.P. 11 (j); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39
(Utah Ct.App. 1988).
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is provided
in full in Addendum B: United States Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV. Utah Code
§41-6a-804. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1101(1) (2011).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information charged Romeo Lucero Olivarez ("Mr. Olivarez") with five
charges that stemmed from a traffic stop that occurred on April 30, 2013. R. 1-3. After a
bindover of the matter at a Preliminary Hearing, Mr. Olivarez's trial counsel filed a
Motion & Memorandum to Suppress Evidence which argued, in part, that Officer Jeremy
Crowther (Officer Crowther) performed an unreasonable stop of Mr. Olivarez under the
Fourth Amendment. R. 24-25, 35-46. The State filed an Objection to Defendant's Motion
to Suppress. R. 47-55. After evidence was presented and argued at the Motion Hearing,
the trial court denied Mr. Olivarez's request to suppress evidence. R. 56-60, 65-68, 138172; see also Addendum C (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). Subsequently, on
April 6, 2015, Mr. Olivarez entered conditional guilty pleas, pursuant to State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), to two counts of Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, both third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). R. 8693. Mr. Olivarez was sentenced to a suspended prison term for both felony counts and
was placed on AP&P supervision for this matter. R. 85-86. Mr. Olivarez filed a timely
notice of appeal. R. 75-76.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Facts Relevant to the Stop of Mr. Olivarez

On April 30, 2013, Mr. Olivarez was driving a white vehicle in the vicinity of 79
West and 900 South, in Salt Lake County. R. 1, 142-144. At one point, Mr. Olivarez
initiated his turning signal to indicate that he was preparing to change lanes. R. 142, 153.
After initiating his signal, Mr. Olivarez proceeded to change lanes. R. 142, 153. He then
travelled across two lanes of traffic "in one continuous movement" until he reached the
far right lane. R. 142, 153. Because of this driving pattern, Officer Crowther activated his
lights and initiated a stop of Mr. Olivarez. R. 143-144.
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that although Mr. Olivarez
initiated his traffic signal prior to changing lanes, he nevertheless stopped Mr. Olivarez
because he "went across all the traffic without leaving the appropriate two second
signal." R. 142. Officer Crowther specifically noted that there were a total of four lanes
on the road and that Mr. Olivarez began "in Lane 2, signal[ ed], and then [went] across the
lane of traffic to the far right or No. 4 lane." R. 142; R. 153. Thus, Officer Crowther
pulled over Mr. Olivarez because, in making "one continuous movement," he failed to
signal for two seconds when traveling from lane 3 to lane 4, even though Mr. Olivarez
properly signaled prior to starting his lane change from lane 2. R. 65-66, 142; R. 153.
B.

Facts Relevant to Officer Crowther's Decision to Impound

After Officer Crowther initiated his lights, Mr. Olivarez pulled over to "the side of
the road" and stopped the vehicle "outside the lane of travel." R. 148. Officer Crowther
then approached Mr. Olivarez and asked him for his license, registration, and proof of
4

insurance. R. 145, 156. Mr. Olivarez did not have his driver's license on him. R. 145-146.
Officer Crowther then used Mr. Olivarez's name and date of birth to confirm that Mr.
Olivarez's license was denied. R. 146. In addition, Officer Crowther obtained
information that the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving was not registered to him. R.
146, 156.
Officer Crowther then "did a little bit of research" and looked into whether Mr.
Olivarez had any warrants or criminal history. R. 146-147, 156. This research revealed
that Officer Crowther had "previous encounters" with Mr. Olivarez and had arrested him
"several months prior." R. 147. Officer Crowther also found information that showed that
Mr. Olivarez was both "a documented gang member" and "documented drug user." R.
147. At this point, Officer Crowther decided that he was going to impound the vehicle. R.
147. At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that he decided to impound the
vehicle "[d]ue to the fact that [Mr. Olivarez] was driving on a denied or he didn't have a
valid driver's license." R. 147.
A second police officer arrived to assist Officer Crowther, and after he arrived,
both officers approached Mr. Olivarez to inform him that because his "driver's license
was suspended or denied[,]" Officer Crowther "was going to impound the vehicle." R.
147-148.
Upon hearing that the vehicle was going to be impounded, Mr. Olivarez asked to
make a phone call. R. 149. Officer Crowther informed Mr. Olivarez that "he could make
his phone call once he was outside the vehicle so [Officer Crowther] could start the
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impound." R. 149. 1 Officer Crowther testified at the Motion Hearing that Mr. Olivarez
had told him at some point that the car belonged to his brother and that he wished to call
him, but Officer Crowther could not remember when that information was conveyed to
him. R. 153-154.

C.

Facts Relevant to the Arrest of Mr. Olivarez
Once Mr. Olivarez stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Crowther asked him if he

was in possession of any weapons or anything illegal. R. 149, 156. Mr. Olivarez replied
that he had a pair of brass knuckles in the front pocket of his shorts. R. 149, 157. Mr.
Olivarez also consented to a search of his person. R. 149, 157. The search of Mr.
Olivarez resulted in Officer Crowther finding the brass knuckles. R. 150.
Officer Crowther handcuffed and arrested Mr. Olivarez because of the concealed
weapon that he was carrying. R. 150. Mr. Olivarez was then taken to the front seat of
Officer Crowther's vehicle. R. 150.

D.

Facts Relevant to the Impound Search and Arrival of Mr. Olivarez's Brother
After placing Mr. Olivarez in the police vehicle, the two officers started an

impound inventory search. R. 150, 152. The search resulted in finding "a blue flashlight
on the front seat, driver's side floor that contained meth, methamphetamine, heroin, and
marijuana and then a glass pipe that appeared to have been used to smoke narcotics was
also located near the driver's seat." R. 152.

1

At the Preliminary Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that Mr. Olivarez asked to make
a phone call in order "to have somebody ... come pick up the vehicle or come pick him
up." R. 113, 124. Officer Crowther also testified at the Preliminary Hearing that Mr.
Olivarez did not consent to the search of his vehicle. R. 125.
6

After the impound search was completed, a tow company arrived and began
hooking up the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez had been driving to the back of the tow truck. R.
152. At this point, Mr. Olivarez's brother, the registered owner of the vehicle arrived. R.
152-153. He arrived as a result of Mr. Olivarez's phone call. R. 151. Because the
impound process had already begun and was almost complete, the officers proceeded
with impounding the vehicle rather than giving the vehicle to Mr. Olivarez's brother. R.
152.
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that the vehicle was impounded
because there was no driver qualified to take possession of the vehicle. R. 158. He also
testified that he did not believe that the car was stolen. R. 159.
E.

Facts Relevant to Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policies
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther provided testimony about the impound

procedures outlined in Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policy ("Impound
Policy"). R.150-151; see also State's Ex. #2 (The Impound Policy), attached as
Addendum D. The Impound Policy states that, "[t] o avoid needless expense and

inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether
or not a vehicle should be impounded." R.151 (emphasis added); see also Addendum D.
Officer Crowther also testified that a purpose of an impound search is to "document any
items [or] articles that are inside the vehicle before it gets impounded so that there's a
record of what was left inside the vehicle." R. 150. Officer Crowther complied with the
impound policy by filling out an impound form. R. 150-151.
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A copy of the Impound Policy was submitted as evidence at the Motion Hearing.
R. 151; see also Addendum D. This Impound Policy states that "[ o]fficers of this

Department may impound vehicles as a means of enforcing local and State laws,
removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its
contents until the owner can take possession of it." see Addendum D; see also R. 154.
According to the Impound Policy, police officers are not supposed to impound an
occupied vehicle if its registration has been expired for less than 90 days. Id. If the
vehicle registration has been expired for more than 90 days, an officer "may" impound
the occupied vehicle, but "[ o]fficers may exercise discretion on the side of not
impounding as the facts of the situation dictate." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the

Impound Policy states that unoccupied vehicles that lack proper registration will not be
impounded unless there is a need to enforce "any City Ordinances applicable, including
abandoned vehicles and streets for storage." Id. The Impound Policy also points out that
vehicles will not be impounded simply because they are not insured. Id.
F.

Facts Relevant to the Motion Hearing

At the Motion Hearing, defense counsel argued that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was
not justified because the method by which Mr. Olivarez changed lanes complied with
applicable Utah law. R. 160. Further, defense counsel argued that the officer made a
"mistake in law" in thinking that there was a legal requirement for Mr. Olivarez to "stop
for any particular time in lane 3 before going over to lane 4." R. 160. Defense counsel
also argued that the vehicle impound violated the Impound Policy that the officer was
required to follow. See R. 162. (The vehicle "was [in] a safe place, not blocking traffic ...
8

its part of their policy ... to protect a vehicle and its contents until the owner can take
possession of it."). Furthermore, "Mr. Olivarez had called his brother and told [Officer
Crowther] he wanted his brother to come take possession of the car and the officer
refused to do that." R. 163.
At the Motion Hearing, the State argued that Mr. Olivarez's lane change was
illegal because it was not made with "reasonable safety" as is required by the statute
regarding lane changes. R. 164. The State also argued that the statute requires a driver to
signal for two seconds prior to commencing a lane change, but also to "remain[] in [each]
lane for two additional seconds" when completing a lane change involving several lanes.

R. 164.
The State argued that the vehicle impound was permissible because the impound
policy gives discretion to officers in determining whether to impound a vehicle. R. 164.
The State also argued that the officer used his discretion to impound the vehicle because
the vehicle had only one occupant who did not have a valid driver's license. R. 164. The
State argued that "the impound inventory was appropriate at the time of the stop." R. 164.
The State pointed out that by the time the owner of the vehicle arrived, the impound
process was almost complete and the Fourth Amendment did not require Officer
Crowther to ignore the results of the inventory search that was already completed. R. 165.
The trial judge concluded that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was justified. R. 67, 166;
Addendum C. The trial court also concluded that Officer Crowther acted within his
discretion to impound the vehicle because "the totality of circumstances" showed that
Mr. Olivarez was "operating a vehicle without a license, was not the proper owner of that
9

vehicle ... [and that he] made admissions to a dangerous weapon." R. 67, 166; Addendum
C.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing to justify the traffic stop of Mr. Olivarez. Utah's lane change law requires a
driver to signal for two seconds prior to beginning or initiating their vehicle's movement.
Mr. Olivarez complied with this law. Officer Crowther, however, unreasonably mistook
Utah's lane change law to require that a driver be required to signal and stay in each lane
for two seconds when doing a lane change involving several lanes. Utah's lane change
law is clear, unambiguous, and contrary to Officer Crowther's interpretation of the law.
Because Officer Crowther's interpretation was not a reasonable mistake of law, the traffic
stop of Mr. Olivarez was unjustified and the fruits obtained from the unconstitutional stop
should have been suppressed by the trial court.
The impound search of the vehicle was unreasonable and improper for numerous
reasons. The impound search was tainted by the illegal stop of Mr. Olivarez. In addition,
the impoundment of the vehicle was not authorized by state statute. The totality of the
circumstances also showed that Officer Crowther lacked a legitimate community caretaking purpose to impound the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving. The vehicle was
stopped at the side of the road and was not impeding traffic, thus police custodial care of
the vehicle was not necessary. In addition, the registered owner of the vehicle, Mr.
Olivarez's brother, was able to quickly retrieve the vehicle from the scene. However,
rather than allowing for the release of the vehicle to its registered owner, Officer
10

Crowther improperly impounded and searched the vehicle. The impoundment of the
vehicle also violated the standardized impoundment procedures that Officer Crowther
was required to follow. Because the initial stop and ensuing vehicle impound was
improper under the Fourth Amendment, the illegally obtained fruits of the impound
search should have been suppressed.

ARGUMENT

I. Officer Crowther Lacked Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion of Wrongdoing
to Justify the Stop of Mr. Olivarez
The United States Constitution provides a protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U. S. Const. Amends IV, XIV. The stop of an automobile by a
police officer constitutes a seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and
must therefore be reasonable to withstand a constitutional challenge. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). A stop is
considered reasonable, or justified, if "a police officer has a reasonable suspicion, prior to
the stop, that a person is engaging in, or has engaged in, criminal behavior." Salt Lake

City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, if 7, 177 P.3d 655, 659.
Here, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Olivarez because:
1) Mr. Olivarez's lane change complied with Utah law regarding lane change
requirements, and 2) Officer Crowther did not make a reasonable mistake of law in
deciding to stop Mr. Olivarez for his lane change maneuver.
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C. Mr. Olivarez's Lane Change Was Legal Under Utah Law
The lane changes completed by Mr. Olivarez complied with Utah law. Utah Code
§41-6a-804 outlines the requirements of lane changes. It says,
(a) person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or change lanes
until:
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section.
(b) A signal of intention to tum right or left or to change lanes shall be given
continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the
movement.
Utah Code §4 l-6a-804 (emphasis added). 2
Under §41-6a-804 (b), a driver must signal prior to starting a lane change
maneuver. The plain language of subsection (b) specifically and clearly requires that the
signal be initiated for the two seconds "preceding," or before, the vehicle begins moving.
See Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, iJ 11, 58 P.3d 873 ("'The plain
language controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look
beyond the plain language"' )(quoting Vigos v. Mountain/and, 2000 UT 2, iJ 13, 993 P.2d
207). See also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,500 (Utah 1989) ("Unambiguous
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.").
Here, Mr. Olivarez's lane change maneuver complied with Utah's lane change
law. Prior to changing lanes, Mr. Olivarez initiated his signal ''preceding the beginning
of the movement" of his vehicle. Utah Code §41-6a-804. R. 142, 153. It was only after
2

Prior to 2007, Utah Code §41-6a-804(b) required a driver to signal "for at least the last
three seconds preceding the beginning of the movement." (emphasis added). Thus, the
current version of the statute reduced the signaling requirement for lane changes from
being three seconds to two seconds.
12

initiating his signal that Mr. Olivarez proceeded to change lanes. R. 142, 153. He then
travelled across two lanes of traffic "in one continuous movement" until he reached the
far right lane. R. 142, 153. As a result of this driving pattern, Officer Crowther activated
his lights and initiated a stop of Mr. Olivarez. R. 143-144. However, because Mr.
Olivarez complied with the clear language of Utah Code §41-6a-804 by signaling before
beginning his "one continuous movement," his lane change maneuver was legal and
Officer Crowther's stop of him was not justified. R. 142, 153. See Bench, 2008 UT App
30, ifif 7, 12-13 (a traffic stop of the defendant was not justified because even though
defendant was changing lanes too slowly, he complied with the statutory requirement by
signaling prior to beginning his lane change.).
Because Officer Crowther lacked justification to stop Mr. Olivarez, the fruits of
the stop are tainted and should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963). See also State v. Callahan, 2004 UT App 164, if 8, 93 P.3d 103 ('"The
exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the
'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional
and statutory rights."') (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court erred in not suppressing
the evidence as a result of the improper and unconstitutional stop of Mr. Olivarez.

v)
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D. Officer Crowther's Interpretation of Utah's Lane Change Law Was
Not a Reasonable Mistake of Law
The United States Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop can be justified if a
police officer makes a reasonable mistake of law. Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530,
532 (2014). In Heien, a police officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two break
lights was not working. The officer, however, made a mistake in interpreting an
ambiguous North Carolina statute which only required that a driver have a single working
brake light. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534. The United States Supreme Court held that despite
the mistake of law, reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop existed because the police
officer's mistake about the North Carolina brake light law was reasonable. Id. at 534,
539-40. In determining whether an officer's mistake is reasonable, a court should "not
examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved." Heien, 135 S.
Ct. at 539. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ("Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). Rather, "the
Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes-whether of
fact or law-must be objectively reasonable." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (alterations in the
original).
A police officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake of law only when the
law at issue is ambiguous. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534, 540-41. In Heien, the Court held that
the officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable because the "unclear" and
"ambiguous" North Carolina statute regarding stop lamps contained words that could
lead one to reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that more than one brake light was
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required. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 540-41. The Heien court noted that "[a]lthough the
North Carolina statute at issue refers to 'a stop lamp,' suggesting the need for only a
single working brake light, it also provides that '[t]he stop lamp may be incorporated into
a unit with one or more other rear lamps." Id. at 540. In addition, "another subsection of
the same provision requires that vehicles 'have all originally equipped rear lamps or the
equivalent in good working order.' ... arguably indicating that if a vehicle has multiple
'stop lamp[s],' all must be functional." Id. at 540 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court held
that because the North Carolina statute failed to articulate the difference between a stop
lamp and a brake light, and also made reference to multiple stop "lamps" in the plural,
rather than just a singular "lamp," it was objectively reasonable for the police officer to
mistakenly interpret the law as requiring a driver to have more than one operating brake
light. Id.
Circumstances where a police officer makes a reasonable mistake of law will be
"exceedingly rare" because it will only apply in those instances where "the statute is
genuinely ambiguous[,]" and where "the statute must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very
hard question of statutory interpretation."' Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J. and
Ginsberg, J., concurring). See also Michael A. Haiwin, Ignorance of the Law is No

Excuse-Unless You Are a Police Officer: Limiting Heien v. North Carolina in
Pretextual DUI Stops, 2015 WL 5565330, at *2 (2015). In concluding that the police
officer in Heien made a reasonable mistake of the North Carolina statute, the Court
pointed out that the North Carolina statute regarding rear lamps posed a "quite difficult
question of interpretation." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Kagan, J. and Ginsberg, J.,
15

concurring). Thus, Heien should not be interpreted as allowing police officers a
reasonable mistake of law when the law that is being interpreted is clearly and
unambiguously stated. Id. "Heien is not an invitation for officers to play fast and loose
with the law: 'an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy
study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce."' Ha,win, supra, at *3(quoting Heien, 135
S. Ct. at 539-40).
An example of an unreasonable mistake of law by a police officer involved New
Jersey's high beam statute. State v. Scriven, No. A-5680-13T3, 2015 WL 773824 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015). The plain language of the New Jersey statute
prohibited a driver from using his high beams when within five hundred feet of an
operating and oncoming vehicle who is in the opposing lane of traffic. Id. In Scriven, a
police officer stopped a driver for failing to tum off his vehicle's head beams when
driving past the officer who was located in the same lane and was standing outside of his
vehicle. Id. The police officer stopped the vehicle because he interpreted the New Jersey
high beam statute as qualifying his police car as an "oncoming vehicle." Id. Applying

Heien, the court held that the officer made an unreasonable mistake in interpreting the
"clear and unambiguous" New Jersey statute because the officer's "patrol car was
stationary and unoperated and it was not in the lane of traffic ... opposite the driver." Id.

See also Attocknie v. Smith, 798 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2015) (a deputy sheriff
was not granted immunity for barging into a home and shooting an inhabitant because he
had a gross misunderstanding of the clearly established hot pursuit of a felon doctrine).
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Another example of a police officer committing an unreasonable mistake of law
involved Texas's tum statute. United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246,250 (5th
Cir. 2015). The Texas statute required a driver to signal 100 feet prior to making a tum.
In Alvardo-Zara, a police officer interpreted the Texas statue to justify his stop of a driver
for failing to signal 100 feet prior to changing lanes. Id. at 249-50. Applying Heien, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the officer's mistake oflaw was not objectively
reasonable because the plain language of the Texas statute clearly and unambiguously
only applied to turns and not lane changes. Id. The court noted that the officer "did not
interpret the statute that narrowly[,]" and that the Texas statute referred "to turns and lane
changes separately, thereby setting out a distinction between the two." Id. The court also
noted that Texas case law and the Texas Driver's Handbook also proved that the police
officer's interpretation of the Texas tum law statute was unreasonably mistaken. Id.
Here, Officer Crowther mistakenly and unreasonably interpreted Utah Code §416a-804, which provides unambiguous and clearly established law regarding lane change
requirements. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250. At the Motion Hearing, Officer
Crowther testified that although Mr. Olivarez initiated his traffic signal prior to changing
lanes, he nevertheless stopped Mr. Olivarez because he "went across all the traffic
without leaving the appropriate two second signal." R. 142. Officer Crowther specifically
noted that there were a total of four lanes on the road and that Mr. Olivarez began "in
Lane 2, signal[ed], and then [went] across the lane of traffic to the far right or No. 4
lane." R. 142; R. 153. Officer Crowther pulled over Mr. Olivarez because he failed to
signal for two seconds when traveling from lane 3 to lane 4, even though Mr. Olivarez
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properly signaled prior to starting his lane change from lane 2. R. 142; R. 153. Thus,
Officer Crowther interpreted Utah's lane change law as requiring a driver to signal and
remain for two seconds in each lane change in a two lane change scenario.
The plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b) shows that Officer Crowther
made an unreasonable and mistaken interpretation of Utah's lane change law. As stated
supra, the plain language of Utah's lane change law requires a driver to signal "for at
least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the [vehicle's] movement.,, Utah
Code §41-6a-804(b) (emphasis added). The plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b)
is clear and unambiguous. Cf Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 540-41. It states that the two
second requirement only applies prior to the initial movement of the vehicle in a lane
change maneuver.
In addition, interpreting the plain language of Utah's lane change law to require a
driver to stay in each lane for two seconds when doing a multiple lane change is
unreasonable and mistaken as this interpretation contradicts the requirement in subsection
(a) that a lane change must only occur when it can be made with "reasonable safety."
Utah Code §41-6a-804(a).That is, completing a reasonably safe lane change could require
seconds or minutes to complete, depending upon traffic, lighting conditions, and a myriad
of other road hazards that might exist when making a lane change. Thus, a plain language
reading of Utah's lane changing statute reveals that the statute does not dictate the
number of seconds that a car is required to stay in each lane in order to do a multiple lane
change with reasonable safety. See Utah Code §41-6a-804(a). Rather, the plain language
of the statute makes explicit the number of seconds (two) that a driver must signal before
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"beginning" their lane change maneuver, consisting of one or more lanes, so that the
driver effectively notifies other drivers that the movement of their car is about to begin.
See Utah Code §41-6a-804(b). Thus, because the plain language of Utah Code §41-6a804 is unambiguous and clearly stated, Officer Crowther made an unreasonable mistake
oflaw in his interpretation of Utah's lane change law. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at
250; see also Scriven, 2015 WL 773824.
Applying Alvardo-Zarza, Utah case law pertaining to Utah's lane change laws
interprets the signaling requirement of the statute to apply prior to the beginning of the
lane change movement, as opposed to after a lane change maneuver has already begun.
Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50; see also United States v. Paul, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1157,
1163 (D. Utah 2003) (Applying Utah's pre-2007 statute, a traffic stop of a vehicle was
justified where an officer "observed a violation of Utah law when he saw defendant's
vehicle change lanes before signaling/or the required three seconds ... [and the officer]
testified that the defendant did not signal a lane change until she had already crossed into
the center lane). See also Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ,r12 (A stop was not justified where
the driver "signal[ ed] two seconds longer than legally required before changing lanes ..
[as] drivers must signal at least three seconds before changing lanes.") (emphasis added).
United States v. Slater, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1214, at 1216 (D. Utah 2005). ("Utah law
requires that a vehicle signal for three seconds before making a lane change.") (emphasis
added).
Similar to Alvardo-Zarza, the Utah Drivers Handbook ("Handbook") further
demonstrates that Officer Crowther unreasonably interpreted Utah's lane change statute
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because the Handbook indicates that there is a "distinction" between the rules regarding
signaling requirements and those rules regarding lane changes, and that these rules are
treated separately from each other. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50; see also 2015
Handbook, Chapter 3, attached at Addendum E. That is, a comparison of the "Signaling"
section of the Handbook with the "Changing lanes" section of the Handbook shows that
these sections give "distinct" and "separate" rules to follow to ensure driver safety. See

Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50. For instance, in Chapter 3, the "Signaling" section
states that drivers should signal "for two seconds before beginning any lane change." See
Addendum E. (emphasis added). This requirement tracks the language of Utah Code
§4 l-6a-804 that requires a driver to initiate a signal ''preceding the beginning of the

movement" of their vehicle. However, as with Utah Code §41-6a-804, the "Signaling"
section in the Handbook does not mention any signaling requirement that should be
followed after the lane change has begun. In addition, the "Changing Lanes" section of
the Handbook, in Chapter 3, provides a number of requirements that will ensure that a
driver makes a safe lane change, such as the need to "glance in your rearview mirror,"
"check[] over your shoulder, "and "maintain your speed." See Addendum E. This section,
however does not mention any requirement that a signal must be initiated for two seconds
after a lane change has begun, or that a vehicle must remain in each lane change for two
seconds when doing a lane change involving several lanes. 3

3

The 2013 edition of the Utah Driver Handbook is not available. However, The Utah
Government Digital Library contains the following editions of the Utah Driver
Handbook: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. See Archived editions of the Utah
Driver Handbook, UTAH GOVERNMENT DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://digitallibrary.utah.gov
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Thus, the plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b), Utah case law regarding
lane changes, and the Utah Drivers Handbook individually and collectively show that
Officer Crowther made an unreasonable mistake of law in believing that he had
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Olivarez for failing to signal and remain for
two seconds in each lane in a two lane change scenario. R. 65-66, 142; R. 153. Rather,
Mr. Olivarez complied with Utah's lane change law because he initiated a signal prior to
starting his lane changes that consisted of "one continuous movement." R. 65-66, 142; R.
153. Because Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Mr.
Olivarez, the fruits of the unconstitutional stop are tainted and the trial court should have
suppressed them. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also State v.

Callahan, 2004 UT App 164, iJ 8, 93 P.3d 103.
This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to Suppress Hearing held
on December 9, 2013. R. 160-162. Counsel argued that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was not
justified because Mr. Olivarez complied with "the [Utah] code provision relating to
signaling before changing lanes," and that Officer Crowther's interpretation of the code
provision was a "mistake of law." R. 160. Nevertheless, if this Court finds that this issue
was not preserved, this Court may review it for plain error. Plain error requires reversal
/awweb/main.jsp. In addition, The Utah Driver License Division website contains the
2014 and 2015 editions of the Utah Driver Handbook. See Dept. of Public Safety, Driver
License Div., Utah Driver Handbook (2014), http://dld.utah.gov/wp-content/ uploads
/sites/17/2015/01/Driver-Handbook-2014.pdf. See also Dept. of Public Safety, Driver
License Div., Utah Driver Handbook (2015), http://dld.utah.gov/wp-content/ uploads/
sites/17/2015/01/ Driver-Handbook-2015.pdf. A comparison of the editions from 2007 to
2015 shows no changes to the sections in Chapter 3 of"SIGNALING," and "Changing
Lanes."
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where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Under a plain error analysis, errors existed here as Mr. Olivarez's lane change
complied with Utah law; furthermore, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving because he did not make a
reasonable mistake oflaw in interpreting Utah's unambiguous and clearly stated lane
change law. See supra 12-19. In addition, the errors should have been obvious to the
district court under the existing case law as set forth supra at 12-19. The "obviousness
requirement poses no rigid and insurmountable barrier to review." See State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). That is,
Utah's lane change law is well established law, as is the case law regarding what
constitutes reasonable mistakes oflaw. See Utah Code §41-6a-804; see also Heien, 135
S. Ct. at 534 540-541. Mr. Olivarez was also prejudiced by the errors because he now
has felony convictions as a result of the unjustified stop the vehicle that he was driving.
Because obvious error occurred here and that error prejudiced Mr. Olivarez, this court
can reverse under the plain error doctrine.

II.

The Impound Search of Mr. Olivarez's Vehicle Violated the Fourth
Amendment Because it Lacked Reasonable and Proper Justification
Warrantless searches of impounded vehicles must not run afoul of the Fourth

Amendment. See United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015) ("The
government bears the burden of proving that its impoundment of a vehicle satisfies the
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Fourth Amendment."). The United States Supreme Court has established "that some
warrantless impoundments are constitutional: namely, those required by the communitycaretaking functions of protecting public safety and promoting the efficient movement of
traffic." Id. at 1245; see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976)
(stating "this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing
or protecting the car and its contents."). Thus, "warrantless searches of impounded
vehicles for the benign purpose of protecting the police and public from danger, avoiding
police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property, are
permitted by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Romero, 624 P. 2d 699, 701 (Utah 1981).
This Court has held that an impoundment of a vehicle is constitutional only when
"a reasonable and proper justification existed for the impoundment." State v. Strickling,
844 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Furthermore, an officer's subjective motivation
is not relevant when determining whether an impound is justified; rather, the inquiry
turns on whether a reasonable officer would have made the impound. Id. at 844 P.2d at
987.
Here, the impound search of the vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving was improper
for multiple reasons: 1) the impound search was not authorized by state statute; 2) the
totality of circumstances surrounding the impound show that there was no legitimate
community care-taking purpose for the impoundment; 3) the impoundment did not follow
standardized police procedures; and 4) the impound search was tainted by the initial
unreasonable and unjustified stop of Mr. Olivarez.
23

A. The Impound of the Vehicle Was Not Justified by Utah Statute
An inventory search pursuant to a vehicle impound is justified, "either through
explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surrounding the initial stop." State
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1985). Utah Code §41-la-1101 defines situations

where statutory authorization for vehicle impounds in Utah is allowed. See Addendum A,
Utah Code §41-la-1101(1)(201 l)(amended 2015). Utah's impound statute specifically
allows for vehicles to be impounded in situations where the vehicle has been stolen,
abandoned, or lacks proper registration, insurance, or identification information. Utah
Code Ann. §41-la-l l0l(l)(a). See State v. Strickling, 844 P. 2d 979 (1993) (Utah's
impound statute authorized the impound of a vehicle where proper registration was
lacking).
An examination of Utah's impound statute shows that the impound of the vehicle
driven by Mr. Olivarez was not authorized by statute. Officer Crowther stated that his
decision to impound the vehicle was based upon "the fact that [Mr. Olivarez] was driving
on a denied or he didn't have a valid driver's license." R. 147. A review of Utah's
impound statute does not, however, provide explicit authority for a police officer to
impound a vehicle in a scenario where the driver is driving without a valid license. Thus,
Utah Code §41-1a-1101 (1) (2011) did not provide authority for Officer Crowther to
impound the vehicle that was driven by Mr. Olivarez.
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B. The Totality of Circumstances Show That There Was No Legitimate
Community Care-Taking Purpose For The Impoundment
Police officers are given authority to impound vehicles in situations not expressly
authorized by statute when the circumstances show that a police officer is both following
standardized police procedures and acting in a community-caretaking role. See Sanders,
796 F.3d at 1243 ("when a vehicle is not impeding traffic or impairing public safety,
impoundments are constitutional only if guided by both standardized criteria and a
legitimate community-caretaking rationale ... [and] either failure alone would be

sufficient to establish unconstitutionality.) (emphasis added).
In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court outlined a number of reasons why
police officers may impound a vehicle for community care-taking purposes:
To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve
evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways
or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control
activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which
violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety
and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69.

By contrast, arbitrary impoundments lack an objectively reasonable community
care taking purpose. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). To guard against
arbitrary impoundments, courts have held that impoundments must be "supported by a
reasonable, non-pretextual justification." Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249. The purpose of an
impound cannot be to allow a police officer an opportunity to search for evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. See United States v. Taylor, 592 F. 3d 1104, 1108 (10 th Cir. 2010)
(stating that an officer cannot impound a vehicle "in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
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investigation."); see also State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) ("an inventory search is
improper when conducted only as a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive
e.g., to obtain evidence in place of a full-blown investigative search.") (internal citations
omitted). See also State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1997) (impound inventory searches
are illegal if they are "merely a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.")
(internal quotations omitted).
Courts employ an objective standard to determine whether an impoundment is
justified according to a legitimate community care taking purpose. United States v.
Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2015). See also Chad Carr, To Impound or Not
to Impound: Why Courts Need to Define Legitimate lmpoundment Purposes to Restore
Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights to Motorists, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 95, 110-14 (2010).
"[T]he existence or absence of justification for the impoundment of an automobile may
be determined from the surrounding circumstances." State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452,454
(Utah 1987) see also State v. Gray, 851 P. 2d 1217 (1993); State v. Romero, 624 P. 2d
699, 701 (Utah 1981).
Furthermore, when determining whether the totality of circumstances show that an
impound is based on an objectively reasonable community-caretaking purpose, courts
have looked at a number of factors, including:
( 1) whether the vehicle is on public or private property;
(2) if on private property, whether the property owner has been consulted;
(3) whether an alternative to impoundment exists (especially another person
capable of driving the vehicle);
(4) whether the vehicle is implicated in a crime; and
(5) whether the vehicle's owner and/or driver have consented to the impoundment.
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Sanders, 796 F.3d at1250.
There are limitations placed on police officers when deciding to impound a
vehicle. The community care-taking purpose does not permit an officer to automatically
impound and search a vehicle upon the arrest of the vehicle's driver. See Sanders, 796
F.3d at 1245 ("Opperman 'cannot be used to justify the automatic inventory of every car
upon the arrest of its owner."') (quoting United States v. Pappas, 735 F. 2d 1232, 1234
(10 th Cir. 1984). Similarly, the community care-taking purpose does not allow an officer
to automatically impound a vehicle when a driver is given a traffic citation. See Sanders,
796 F.3d at 1250 (stating that "even if the police were to adopt a standardized policy of
impounding all vehicles whose owners receive traffic citations, such impoundments
could be invalidated as unreasonable under our precedent.").
The Minnesota Supreme Court established a two-prong objective test for
determining whether an impoundment is justified. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008). See also Chad Carr, supra, at 117. According to the first prong, a
balancing test is employed to see whether the government had "an interest in
impoundment that outweigh[ed] the individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures." Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. And, according to the
second prong, the government must show that the impoundment complied with
standardized police procedures. Id. Gauster also pointed out that when determining
whether an impoundment is necessary or reasonable, it is important to look at the
circumstances that existed "at the time of the impoundment" Id. at 505. The court
emphasized that if the totality of circumstances show that the impoundment was not
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necessary, then "the concomitant [inventory] search is unreasonable." Gauster, Id. at 502.
(internal quotations omitted).
In applying the two-prong test, Gauster determined that the impoundment of the
vehicle in that matter was not justified. Id. at 507. In Gauster, an officer decided to
impound a vehicle because the driver did not have a valid driver's license nor proof of
insurance. Id. at 500. When the officer made the decision to impound the vehicle, the
defendant was not under arrest and was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Id. Once
informed about the officer's decision to impound, the driver asked if he could arrange for
someone else to retrieve the vehicle, but the officer refused. Id. The impound search
resulted in finding methamphetamine, open containers containing alcohol, and a pipe
used to inject drugs. Id.
Gauster held that there was no justification for the officer to impound the vehicle

because there were no safety concerns (the vehicle was located on the side of a county
road), and there was no legitimate care-taking need to justify the impound. Id. at 504-508.

It pointed out that "[b]ecause [the defendant] took responsibility for the vehicle ... the
need to protect [the] vehicle was obviated, leaving no proper purpose for the
impoundment." Id. at 506. The court also highlighted that "[h]ere, there were no
passengers and no other parties on the scene who could take responsibility for [the
defendant's] vehicle. But because [the defendant] was not under arrest, [defendant]
himself... [he] was available to take custody of the vehicle and make proper
arrangements." Id. at 506.
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Gauster also addressed the responsibilities that are placed a police officer when

deciding to impound a vehicle. Id. at 507-508. The court noted that the Fourth
Amendment did not require the police to ask an arrested driver if he wants to make
alternative arrangements for his vehicle prior to impound. Id. at 507. However, in
situations where the driver is not arrested at the time the officer decides to impound the
vehicle, the impound is unnecessary and therefore not justified. Id. at 507. Furthermore,
"police still may be under an obligation to permit a driver to make reasonable alternative
arrangements when the driver is able to do so and specifically makes a request to do so."
Id. at 508. Because the defendant in Gauster "was not placed under arrest and ... asked

[the officer] if he could make his own vehicle arrangements-the impoundment of [the
defendant's] vehicle was not justified under the Fourth Amendment." Id..
Here, applying the Sanders factors, as well Gauster, the impound of the vehicle
violated the Fourth Amendment because the totality of circumstances show that Officer
Crowther lacked a legitimate care-taking need to justify the impound the vehicle driven
by Mr. Olivarez. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. See also Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502507.
First, even though the vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving was on public, not private,
property, it was not unlawfully parked nor causing a traffic hazard. See United States v.
Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (10th Cir. 1992) ("if the position of the vehicle would

have been a true threat to public safety, the officers would have moved the vehicle to the
side of the road while waiting for the tow truck to arrive."). Here, Mr. Olivarez had pulled
over to "the side of the road" and stopped the vehicle "outside the lane of travel." R. 148.
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Thus, moving the vehicle for traffic purposes was not necessary. Ibarra, 955 F.2d at
1409-10.
Second, Officer Crowther failed to allow for an alternative to impound when Mr.
Olivarez made it clear that a viable and immediate one was available. Gauster, 752
N.W.2d at 508; see also Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1251 (an impoundment was
unconstitutional where officers did not allow the defendant "to make alternative
arrangements, even though she stated that she was willing to have someone up the
vehicle on her behalf' and the vehicle was lawfully parked in a private lot.); see also

Pappas, 735 F. 2d 1232, 1234 (10 th Cir. 1984) (the impound search was not justified
because there were people who could have taken possession of the car once the defendant
was arrested); see also Rice, 717 P.2d at 696 (an impound was improper where "[t]here
[was] no evidence that [] the vehicle posed any danger to the officers or the public [and]
[d]efendant was not permitted to have someone pick up his locked truck from the parking
lot or to arrange other disposition [of his own car]."); see also State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah 1985) (impound unreasonable where "defendant was given no
opportunity to arrange for disposition of his own car. The officer neither asked defendant
whether there was someone who could come and get the car nor asked the passenger
whether she could take possession of the contents of the car or get someone to come and
get the car.").
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that the vehicle was impounded
because Mr. Olivarez did not have a valid driver's license and there was no driver
qualified to take possession of the vehicle. R. 147, 158. However, once Officer Crowther
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told Mr. Olivarez that the vehicle was going to be impounded, Mr. Olivarez asked to call
his brother, the registered owner of the vehicle, in order for him to take possession of the
vehicle. R. 149. Mr. Olivarez was not arrested at this time. R. 147-150. In addition, the
ability of Mr. Olivarez's brother to respond quickly was apparent, as before the vehicle
was towed away from the scene, Mr. Olivarez's brother arrived to retrieve the vehicle. R.
149-153, 163. Thus, the impound of the vehicle was neither reasonable nor necessary
because Mr. Olivarez made it clear that a viable alternative arrangement was available.
This matter is similar to Gauster. In both matters, at the time that the officer made
the decision to impound, the driver was not arrested. R. 147-150; see also Gauster, 752
N.W.2d at 507. Furthermore, both drivers made it clear that they wished to make
alternative arrangements for the vehicle rather than having the impoundment proceed. R.
149-153, 163; see also Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 500. Gauster is a well-reasoned, noncontrolling decision that explains why the impoundment violated the Fourth Amendment.
This Court should also find that the impoundment in this matter was improper.
Third, the vehicle driven by Mr. Olivarez was not implicated in a crime. Sanders,
796 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2015). Officer Crowther specifically testified that he did
not believe that the car was stolen. R. 159. Cf United States v. Maher, 919 F. 2d 1482,
1487 (10th Cir. 1990) (an impound was found reasonable "where the vehicle itself was
evidence of a crime."); see also United States v. Haro-Salcedo, l 07 F.3d 769, 771 (10th
Cir. 1997) (impound justified because officer had reason to believe that the car was
stolen). In addition, the vehicle had no connection to the crime for which Officer
Crowther arrested Mr. Olivarez. That is, Mr. Olivarez was arrested for possessing a

31

concealed weapon because of the pair of brass knuckles that he had in the front pocket of
his shorts. R. 149-150, 157. See Virgil v. Superior Court, Placer Cty., 268 Cal. App. 2d
127, 132, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("the arrest of the defendant (for
vagrancy) had no connection with a necessity to take the accused's car into custody so
there was no necessity [for impound] here.")).
Fourth, the vehicle's owner and Mr. Olivarez did not consent to the impound.
Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1250. Officer Crowther testified that Mr. Olivarez consented to a

search of his person once he was outside of the vehicle. R. 149, 157. However, there was
no testimony provided that either Mr. Olivarez or the vehicle's owner consented to a
search of the vehicle.
Thus, the "totality of circumstances" surrounding Officer Crowther's decision to
impound the vehicle shows that the impound was unnecessary and unreasonable. State v.

Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (1986) ("Absent a statutory basis justifying impoundment, we
look to the totality of the surrounding circumstances to determine the reasonableness of
the seizure of the vehicle."). The circumstances instead show that impoundment of the
vehicle was improperly done for criminal investigation purposes and was not a
performance of Officer Crowther's community care-taking functions. Sanders, 796 F.3d
at 1243.

C. The Impound Search Violated the Salt Lake Police Department's
Impound Policy
Impoundments must follow standardized police procedures to be reasonable and
proper. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-376 (1987). Standardized procedures
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delineate the amount of discretion that an officer has when deciding whether to impound
a vehicle. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1245 (stating that police impound procedures
"circumscribe the discretion of individual officers.") (internal quotations and citation
omitted). If an officer's decision to impound a vehicle and the subsequent impound
search do not comply with recognized police standards, then the fruits of the impound
search should be suppressed. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,270 (Utah 1985) (the
impound inventory search of the defendant's vehicle was improper where the police
officer failed to comply with standard police procedures that required the officer to fill
out a standard inventory form).
Here, Officer Crowther was required to follow the Salt Lake City Police
Department's Impound Policy. R.150-151; see also Addendum D. The Impound Policy
requires officers to exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle in
favor of preventing needless financial burdens and inconveniences to the owner. See
Addendum D. The Impound Policy states, "[t]o avoid needless expense and
inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether
or not a vehicle should be impounded." (emphasis added). It also allows officers to
impound a vehicle as a means of enforcing Utah laws or removing a public nuisance. See
Id. ("Officers of this Department may impound vehicles as a means of enforcing local

and State laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting
the vehicle and its contents until the owner can take possession of it."). Even when the
registration of an occupied vehicle is expired, the Impound Policy prohibits impoundment
unless the registration has been expired for ninety days. And, where registration has been
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expired for more than ninety days, although officers "may" impound the vehicle,
impoundment is not mandatory and "[ o]fficers may exercise discretion on the side of not

impounding as the facts of the situation dictate." Id. (emphasis added). The Impound
Policy points out that vehicles will not be impounded simply because they are not
insured. Id. It also does not allow an officer to impound a vehicle upon arresting or citing
a driver for a traffic violation. Id. This demonstrates further that the Impound Policy
requires officers to exercise their discretion by not impounding vehicles except where
necessary. Thus, reading the Impound Policy in its entirety shows that the policies are
focused on restricting the situations where an officer should impound a vehicle, thus
limiting, rather than increasing, an officer's use of discretion. See Addendum D; see also

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-376; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270; Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1243.
Here, Officer Crowther failed to comply with the Impound Policy. Officer
Crowther did not seek to "avoid needless expense" to the owner of the vehicle because he
opted for impounding the vehicle rather than allowing Mr. Olivarez an opportunity to call
the owner to retrieve his vehicle. See Addendum D; see also R. 147-154. As stated supra,
there was also no legitimate community care-taking purpose to impound the vehicle as it
was not causing a "public hazard or nuisance." See Addendum D; see also Sanders, 796
F.3d at 1243. As also pointed out supra, there was no Utah law or statute which
mandated the impoundment of the vehicle. See Addendum D; see also Utah Code Ann.
§41-la-1101(1) (2011). In addition, because the Impound Policy does not require
impoundment for vehicles that lack insurance or for certain vehicles lacking proper
registration, it likewise follows that lack of driver's license standing alone does not
34

require impound. 4 This is especially true where the registered owner is available and the
other requirements for impound are not met. Thus, Officer Crowther decision to impound
the vehicle directly contravened the impound policies that he was required to follow.

D. The Impound Search Was Tainted By The Initial Unreasonable And
Unjustified Stop of Mr. Olivarez
The vehicle impound in this matter was unjustified because, as argued supra, it
was the result of an illegal stop of Mr. Olivarez. All evidence that was found in the
course of the impound search should therefore be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Furthermore, the inevitable
discovery doctrine cannot remove the taint of the illegal stop and impound search of the
vehicle in this matter as "no inventory of the contents of defendant's vehicle could have
been conducted but for the unlawful impoundment of the vehicle." See Ibarra, 955 F.2d
at 1410. See also State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,I 13, 76 P.3d 1159, 1162 ("The
exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the
'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional

4

In Utah, the crime of driving without insurance is a class B misdemeanor pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-302. The Utah Code also makes it a class B or class C
misdemeanor to drive a vehicle without proper registration under various circumstances.
See Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1303. And, according to the Utah Code, a person who
operates a vehicle without a valid driver's license is guilty of either a class B or class C
misdemeanor, depending on the underlying reasons for why the driving privilege has
been denied. Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227. Because these crimes are charged similarly and
have parallel maximum punishments, there would be no need to treat them differently for
impoundment purposes, and there is nothing in the Impound Policy that suggests
otherwise. Thus, because it is not proper to impound a vehicle for lack of insurance or
lack of registration (unless it has been unregistered for more than 90 days), it is also not
proper to impound a vehicle because the driver lacks a valid driver's license, Officer
Crowther's reason for the impoundment in this matter.
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and statutory rights.") (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501
(1984)). Thus, the trial court erred in failing to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a
result of the Fourth Amendment violations in this matter surrounding the stop and
impound search of the vehicle driven by Mr. Olivarez. Furthermore, as a result of the
trial court's errors, Mr. Olivarez has been unduly prejudiced because he now has two
felony convictions as a result of the unconstitutional violations performed by Officer
Crowther.
This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to Suppress Hearing held
on December 9, 2013. R. 160-163. Counsel argued that the Fourth Amendment required
Officer Crowther to allow Mr. Olivarez an "opportunity to arrange for [the] disposition of
[his vehicle]" prior to impounding it because the vehicle "was [in] a safe place, not
blocking traffic[,] ... and it was clear to the officer that [a] person was available to come
get the car." R. 162-163. Defense counsel also argued that the vehicle impound violated
the Impound Policy that the officer was required to follow. R. 162. Nevertheless, if this
Court finds that this issue was not preserved, this Court may review it for plain error.
Plain error requires reversal where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993).
Under a plain error analysis, an error existed here as Officer Crowther lacked
justification to impound the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving. See supra. In addition,
the errors should have been obvious to the district court because established case law
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discusses the restrictions that arc placed upon officers ,,·hen making impound decisions.
See Bertine~ 479 U.S. at 375-376: Hygh. 711 P.2d at 270; Sanders. 796 F.3d at 1243. In

addition, the trial court was provided a copy

or the Impound Policy that restricted Officer

Crowthcr·s impound decisions. See Addendum D. Mr. Olivarez was also prejudiced by
the errors because he now has felony convictions as a result of the unjustified stop the
vehicle that he was driving. Because obvious error occurred here and that error
prejudiced Mr. Olivarez, this court can reverse under the plain error doctrine.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Mr. Romeo Olivarez requests that this Court reverse the
trial courCs ruling that the stop and impound of Mr. Olivarez's vehicle was legally
justified in this matter.
SUBMITTED this

/5 JI,.
i

dav of December.2015.

.

-Z:::2JJt
TERESA L. WELCH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ,
Defendant.

Case No: 131904665 FS
RANDALL SKANCHY
Judge:
Date:

April 6, 2015

PRESENT
Clerk:
saram
Prosecutor: BECK, STEVEN K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 31, 1984
Sheriff Office#: 267193
Audio
Tape Number:
11 :04

CHARGES
l. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/06/2015 Guilty
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/06/2015 Guilty
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE

RAUL OLIVAREZ

SENTENCE FINE

Printed: 04/06/15 11:13:55

Case No: 131904665 Date:

Charge# 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Apr 06, 2015

$500.00
$0.00
$254.21
$500.00

Charge ff 2
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$500.00
$0
$254.21
$500.00
Plus Interest
Attorney Fees
Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge. Interest may
increase the final amount due.
On
Defendant is to serve 180 days and Is ordered to complete the CATS program.
completion of the CATS program defendant is ordered release.
Defendant is to complete a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment.
Defendant is to pay $300 recoupment.
Defendant is to pay $500 fine, which may be offset with the costs of treatment.
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.

Date:

Printed: 04/06/15 11:13:55
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United States Constitution Amendment IV
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

United States Constitution Amendment XIV

Amendment XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereat: are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2.

f.~~

\'Ji/

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice President. or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
state, ,vho, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States. authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States~ or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.

Utah Code §41-6a-804.
Turning or changing lanes -- Safety -- Signals -- Stopping or sudden decrease in
speed -- Signal flashing -- Where prohibited.
41-6a-804.
(1)

(a)
A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or
change lanes until:
(i)

the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and

(ii)

an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section.

(b)
A signal of intention to turn right or lcfl or to change lanes shall be given
continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the
movement.
(2)
A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first
giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when
there is opportunity to give a signal.
(3)

(a)
A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and
arm or by signal lamps.
(b)
If hand and arm signals are used. a person operating a vehicle shall give the
required hand and arm signals from the left side of the vehicle as follows:
(i)

left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally;

(ii)

right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and

(iii)

stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward.

(c)

A person operating a bicycle or device propelled by human power
may give the required hand and arm signals for a right tum by extending
the right
hand and arm horizontallv., to the right.
.__
...,

(i)

(ii)
(3 )(b )(ii).
(4)

This Subsection (3 )( c) is an exception to the provision of Subsection

A person required to make a signal under this section may not flash a signal:
(a)

on one side only on a disabled vehicle;

(b)
as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching from
the rear; or
(c)
(5)

on one side only of a parked vehicle.

A violation of this section is an infraction.

Utah Code §41-la-1101 (1) (2011)
Seizure -- Circumstances where permitted -- Impound lot standards.
41-la-1101(1)

(l)(a) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor:
(i) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been stolen;
(ii) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered. or obliterated;
(iii) that has been abandoned in accordance with Section 4 l-6a-l 408;
(iv) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees that has
not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid within 30 days;
(v) that is placed on the water with improper registration;
(vi) that is being operated on a highway:
(A) with registration that has been expired for more than three months;
(B) having never been properly registered by the current owner;
(C) with registration that is suspended or revoked; or
(D) subject to the restriction in Subsection (1 )(b), without owner's or
operator's security in effect for the vehicle as required under Section 4 ll 2a-30 I ; or
(vii)(A) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been
involved in an accident described in Section 41-6a-401 ~ 4l-6a-401.3, or 41-6a401.5; and
(B) whose operator did not remain at the scene of the accident until the
operator fulfilled the requirements described in Section 41-6a-40 I or 4 l-6a401. 7.
(b) The division or any peace officer may not seize and take possession of a vehicle under
Subsection ( 1)(a)(vi)(D) if the operator of the vehicle is not carrying evidence of owner's
or operator's security as defined in Section 4 l - l 2a-303 .2 in the vehicle unless the division
or peace officer verifies that owner's or operator's security is not in effect for the vehicle

~

I

I

through the Uninsured Motorist Identification Database created in accordance with
Section 41-12a-803.
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Addendum C

SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
BYRON F. BURMESTER, 6844
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (80 I) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsCase No. 131904665 FS
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ,
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion To Supress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter
on December 9, 2013. The Court considered memoranda submitted by the Defense and the State
as well as testimony and evidence adduced at the motion hearing. The Defendant was
represented by counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, and the State was represented by Deputy District
Attorney, Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant, Romeo Lucero Olivarez was charged with three counts of possession
of controlled substances, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted

person and possession of drug paraphernalia arising out of a traffic stop on
April 30, 2013.
2.

On April 30, 2013 Officer Crowther observed a vehicle coming off the 900 South
exit onto West Temple turn on its right tum signal but change multiple lanes
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without pausing 2 seconds for each lane change. When the vehicle turned east
on 900 South the officer made a traffic stop.
3.

After contactini the Defendant who was the lone occupant of the vehicle, Officer
Crowther discovered the Defendant's drivers license was denied. Officer
Crowther further realized that the Defendant was a kno\VIl gang member and
that he had arrested him recently on unrelated drug charges.

4.

Officer Crowther decided at that point he would impound the vehicle. He
infonned the Defendant and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle that
was registered to someone else.

5.

Officer Crowther asked the Defendant if he had any weapons or contraband on
him, to which the Defendant replied that he had brass knuckles. Officer
Crowther seized the brass knuckles and then arrested the defendant.

6.

Pursuant to Salt Lake City Police Department policy Officer Crowther began an
impound inventory of the vehicle. During the inventory officer Crowther found
methamphetarnine, heroin, and a pipe for ingesting controlled substances.

7.

At some point after the officer had informed the Defendant that he was going to
impound the vehicle, the Defendant requested that he be pennitted to call the
owner to retrieve the vehicle. Someone arrived purporting to be the owner after
the inventory was complete and the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow
truck. The officer declined to tum the vehicle over and completed the impound
process.

8.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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1.

Officer Crowther directly observed a traffic offense and consequently the stop
was justified at its inception. Further, the officer's questioning of the defendant
did not exceed the scope of the purpose of the stop.

2.

Once the vehicle stopped the officer determined that the driver did not have a
valid license; that he was the only occupant; and that the driver was not the
owner. Thus the officer's decision to impound the vehicle did not exceed the
scope of the purpose of the stop.

3.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defndant's criminal
history, gang affiliation, and admission of possessing a dangerous weapon, the
officer had a reasonable belief in his concern for his safety.

4.

Officer Crowther conducted the impound pursuant to his department impound
policy.

5.

Therefore the State has satisfied its burden that the seizure and subsequent
impound were reasonable and the evidence obtained is the not the fruit of the
poisonous tree.

6.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is denied.

DATED this lo th day of

~~r 20J1.

.---~.-. . .............
..
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READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM:

~/
Counsel for Romeo Lucero Olivarez .
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ADDENDUMD

111-400 IMPOUNDS, VEHICLE HOLDS AND
RELOCATIONS
Offic~rs of 1h1s Depa:imcnl may impow1d ,·chicles 3S
u means of enforcing local and S1utc I ..aws, re111ovinu
a public han1rd or nuiSc1ncc, s..:curing cvid~ncc, or
protc1.:t1ng the vehicle and its contcnL'; until the owner

can take possession of i1. To avoid needless expense
ond inconvenience to 1he \'Chicle owner, nfliccrs shall
use dlscn:tion in dctcnnining ,,hctht:r or not a vehicle
should be impounded.

1hc registered owner and lien holder wuhin 5 working
days of impoundrn.:nt whether or not !he vehicle is
being held for e vidence.
The initial oi'licer should deliver !he original copy of
the Notice or lmpou11dmcn1 form to 1he vehicle's
n:gistcrcd owne r or drl\cr Uunng the course of the

11nes1iYa1ion. If the vehicle's 0\\11er or dn vcr has lel1
the scc7,e prior lo impound. !he original should be lc!l
in n visible and safe place tn 1hc vehicle's driver
companmcnl The ofliccr should write "Unavu1lahlc
10 Sign" in 1he ''Dehvcr To"' area The copy should
!hen be forwarded as above.

All impounds will be documcn1cd in !he RMS and on
a Salt l.okc City Police Dcpartmcnl Impound Reeon.
·n,e impounding ol1iccr w,11 provide 1hc mw driver
1he white and pink copies and submit lhc ycllo" copy
10 Records
State Impounds will be documented on !he TC·
5~0/Utah State Tax Commission Vehicle Impound
Report The unpounding otliccr will pro"1dc 1hc 10w
dr,\'er !he yellow copy and subnul 1hc \\•h11c and
goldenrod copies 10 Records, who will forward the
fonn 10 1he lmpC1und Courdi11a1vr in Auto Thell The
Impound Coordinator will send 1ho Impound forms
by mail 10 1hc Motor Vehicle U1v1sion. The pink
copy has \'Chicle release mfonnalion on the rc,·crsc
side and will be left with the dri,er. The Di,•is1on of
~totor Vehicles rnust be nolilicd ,d1!11n ,18 hours of
impound
An impound report form will be completed !'or cvtry
vehicle impounded for any reason

The following pcoccdurc will govern the impounding

uf , chicles for expired registralmn only si1ua1ions
O\·cupicd \ 'rhiclC's· In case$ where a \'Chicle
displaying expired rcg1s1ra11011 is accompanied by 1hc
o,, ntr or a rcsponsihlc party ur if tla: own~r can be
conlackd, and 1ha1 person \'Critics 1hc rcgis1ra1ion is
in fact expired. the fol lowing. applies·
If 1hc exp1ra11on dale is !es, limn 90 days. do nOI
impound
If the cxp<ralion dale is 90 days or more aml
\'cnfication can be obtained us stated above, a
Stale Impound may be in order. Oificers may
exercise discretion on the side ofnol impounding
as the !'nets of the. situation dictate.
Revoked Rcgislra tiun

For various reasons 1he

Dl\1\1 tln revoke the rcgis1ra1ion of a vehicles.

\\'hen the regis1m1ion has been revoked, the vehicle
can be 11npoundcd. holding f'or the vehicle for S1:itc
Tax
Si.CPD will provide 1hc ,chicle 0\\11er a Nmice of
lmpoundmcni and Right 10 Impound I !caring forin
w11hin 48 hours of a city 1mpoundment This form
should no1 be used with State 1a, impo,rnds
The officer w,11 fill m the name of the vehicle owner
d:iwr frorn the information ob1ained by ,alid
identiiic:mon, 1f av~.11labk The tn\JSt current nddrc~s
should be obtlincd

l 'noccupird \'chides Unoccupied vehicles w,11 nol
be impounded for expired rcg1s1ra1ion rdying solely
upon the 1nfonna1ion provided from

1he StalL·

Computer System. Th" policy does noi preclude 1hc
cnforcemcn1 of' any City Ordmanccs applicuhle.
rncl11dmg abandoned vch,clc, or streets for storage.

(If

11,c officer w-dl date and s,gn the forrn and deliver

·:\·o l1Hu ra11l'c" · vchirh:s \\ill 110l be impounded for
the: rc::1.,on of ··No Insurance·• ·'No Insurance·· can be
added 10 1hc c110tion as a secondary Ill the primary
1

rcasnn for impound

the original to the vchtclc owner or driver at the time
oiimpound. Th!.! cop) of the Nmicc of lmpoundmcnt

and Right to Impound I !caring form should be turned
into Records who will forward it lo the Impound
Coordmator lll Aulo Thell
The Impound
Coordina1or v,·ill send notific3tion by certified mail to

•
•

Parking enforcement pers,mncl nrc authorized lo
impound ,·duclcs that ~re parked in v1olat1on or Cny

J1

Ordinances and State Laws Upon rcqut.-st, an officer
of 1his Department will respor.d and provide
assistance as needed
Appropriale reports and
documentation will be entered into lhc RMS b)
Parking Enforcement and mainlained by this

I !old for Owner. The vehicle may he rdeascd to
the owner or the O\rner's representative.
Hold for State Release of the vehicle must be
obtained through the State Di,.is1on of Motor
Vehicles.
Itold Reco\'crcd Stoh:n Is cuhcr a hold for
Dctccti1.cs or hold fo, Owner.
I !old for Evidence. The ..-chicle can only be
released up('ln authorization of the mvcstig:iting
division or the District Annmcy's Office.

Department

If fees arc 10 be wai\ed, the lbllow-np Detective \\ill
go to the Service Desk, obtain the waiver form and
Iii! ii oul completely The follow-up de1ec11vc ,, ill
have the Division/Unit Commander, Ass,,tant
Division/Unit Commander o: Watch Commander
approve and initial the form The follow-up detective
will call the Hearing Ollice at 801-535-6321 and
nutify them that a fax 1s enroutc. The follow-up
dctcc1ive will then fax the torm to lhc l·IL·aru:g Offi,:c
at 801-535-6082
Tl1e Hearing Olliccr will review the form and will
either give approval or denial then fox the fom1 hack
to the Police Department at the number provided by
the follow-up detective The follow-up dctccti\'e will
then return the form to the Service Desk The citizen
will be given a copy to take to the impound lot for
release of the vehicle. If the rccummendation is to
denv the foe waiver, the person requesting the waiver
s:io~ld be referred to the I!caring Officer

llic officer must determine the appropriate I) pc of
impound. Cit~ l)r S1ah: and fill out !he appropriate
11npound form.
Only those lowmg companies
specified by contractual agreement wilh the City w,11
be used to tow 1rr.pounced wh1clcs 1m non-slate
1:npounds There 1s onl)- one City Impound lot
Thcrc arc several .St:1tc-1mpound lots used to store
impounded vch,dcs The rcponing otliccr musl list
the Towmg Comp,my, phone number and dcs11nat1011
in the Vehicle Field on the l:npound Report fmm and
1s to be included in the Scizcdffowed details page of
the R\1S

Ir a car

1s impounded as a recovered stoh:n vehicle,
the car shall~ removed to the City Impound Lot and
"Hold for Owner" Should 1hc vehicle be improperly
rel.!istcred, evidence m another case, ownership in
di;putc, etc., a hl)ld should be placed for the followup squad (Any vch1cl1? which would have been
released to the owner at the scene can be "I !old for
Ownd', when impounded
When a vehicle is
impounded with a hold for evidc11cc, the hold will
expire seven days front the date of impoundmcnt
The lmpounll Coordinator will send the follow-up
Det<.'ctivc: an Impound request for approvu! to release.
If circumstances ret1uirc the hold to he extended past
the seven-day penod, follow-up mvcstigators musl
submit the \Hitten request through their
Division/Unit Commander advising the Impound
Cciordinawr Clf the extension
The lntpClund
Coc,rdinator will update the computer cnt1y on the
Seized/Towed details pa~cs indicating the extension
<lf thc hold. Aficr the extended day has expired, the
[mpound Coordinal<Jr will send a second request for
approval to rch:a.,e The follow-up Detcclm: will
rcmo,,.c the extended hold as soon as poss1hlc

thliroul!h mv<.·ntorv search will he made of nil
vehicles being irr.p~u:idcd A tho~ough 111venlory
scar;:h will include:
1\

The intl!nor of the vehiclt', including under the
scats, the glove box. elc.
Under the hood
lhc trunk, when p<1ssihlc
All closed containers, 1 e, sacks, b:igs, boxes,

etc
At the time of impmm<l, the officer must notify
Dispatch of any holds on the impounded vchicie
Holds will be documented m the Scizcd.rr('lwed
details page
Pohce personnel will refer tel th,s
information when a vehicle owner or the O,\ner's
representative m~uires about release of th~· vehidc

Jhe uflkcr \',ill rernovc all valuables frClm the
v::h1de and place them in cvidl!ncc:
safekeeping
Closed or k1ckcd briefcases. luggage. etc, will bl!
op.:ncd before being placed in evidence Such items
will be opened in the presence of u supervisor 1f the
lm:k~ must be forced or other damage done in order

ror

. '•

to open them. h is recommended the vehicle's o,mcr
or the driver be present
All items not considered valuables, such as s;,arc
tires, old clothing, etc , will be locked in the vehicle's
trunk, if possible.
The officer will include the following in the property
report:
Valuables placed into evidence
Valuable ncms left in the ,·chicle because of the
difficulty of lran,;porting them to evidence (large
machinery, etc) will be listed in the report's
details
If no valuables are found III the whicle, the
officer will note lhat information in the report's
narrative

Authori1.cd AcrcH
Access to impounded vehicles stored in the City
impound lot is limited to
Salt Lake City police officers, officers of the
DEA Metro, and oilkers from outside agencies
including
Motor
Vehicle
Enforcement
Investigator.
The vehicle owner or the owner's representative.
The vchick O\\ncr 1s verified by the State
Vehicle Registration which has been attached to
the case by the first individual to run the
rcgistratmn
The owner's rcprcscn1at1vc must have a
notari1.cd h:ttcr from the registered owner
Venticatiun of release will be by verifying with
Srnte issued driver's 111:ense, State issued ID or
passport against the registration o~ notari1.ed
letter.

If a vehick owner requests release of an impounded
vchiclL· and appears to be intoxicated or othcr,,ise
incapable of operating the vehicle safely,
Service/Impound Desk personnel may request that an
officer be dispalchcd to the desk. The assigned
officer will evaluate the owm•r's condition und take
appropriate actior..
Ii the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to
operate a \'chicle safe!), the vehicle will not be
rdeased. If the owner is incapacitated, but requests
that the vehicle be released to another person. and the
officer is sa1isli1..'d that the other person could legally
operate the vehicle, the otlieer may authom.e release
of the vehicle.

foc;;ess to the C:i 1 lm~cu:iCl Lot
1'io one will he allowed access to the impound lot
without complying with procedures outlined 111 this
P"licy. Impound lots under State control arc not
governed
by
this
poi icy

All fees need to be paid pnor 10 releasing any
vehicle
Insurance Adjusters: The Insurance Adjuster's
1dentificlllion mll be ,·erified by State issul.-d
driver's license, State issued 11) ur passpon
along wtth a business card from the insurance
company with their name on the card If the
Insurance Adjuster is re4ues1ing release of th~
vehicle all fees need to be paid
.Any other person authorized by court order: A
court order will be verified by State issued
dmcr's license, State issued ID or passport If
the coun order states that fees arc to be paid they
need to he paid prior to releasing If the court
order 111d1catcs that the individual is not
responsible for the foes, a \~aiver needs to be
mitiated by the follow-up Dctecti.,,e
Leasing Companies· The representative or the
leasing company must submit n lctler on
Company letter hcnd verifying that he/she is an
employee of that leasing company and is
a:.Jthorizcd to obtnin the release for thot vehicle
All fees arc required 10 he paid prior to releasing
lhl: vehidc

DcJlcrs: The de.ilcr m:.ist show evidence of
o,mcrsh1p along with proof thut they represent
that dealership. The dcaler must also presenl the
dealer plate tu the Impound Yard when
transporting the vehicle from the Impound lot to
the dealership unless towed or transported on a
flatbed. All appropriate fees must be paid pnor
10 g1vmg a release
lkg1stered Lien holders or their representatives
The hen holder must provide a copy of the title
that shows the lien and proves that 1hc hen
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release: se::tion ha-; not been signed St:lle issued
driver's license, Seate ID or a passport 1s required
to verify identification. If a rdcasc is to be given
to the rcprcscntati vc, they nc..:d to ha vc o letter
on company lcucrhcud with the mdi.·1dual '!>
name hstcd 111 the letter authori;,:ing them lo lake
possession of the vehicle
Towing Companies If the insurance company 1s
releasing to a tow company, a copy of the \\Ork
order with the insurance company's information
and name of the individual picking up th..:
vehicle, along with the individual ·s driver's
license. State ID or passport must he submitted
at the tune of' rt:4uc:s1.
If an individual is authorizing a tow company to
t:1kc possession ofthc1r vchidc, a notarized letter
stating the tow company's name needs lo he
submitted al the tim..: of rc4uest lo rcli:'.i~e the
,chicle, along wnh the tow company's driver's•
driver's license. State Id. or passport
All
applicable fees need to hi.: paid :11 the time of
rckasc.
Company or Trust owned V..:hiclcs
The
ind1v1dual rcqucstmg the rclcosc of the vehicle
must suhmit a legal d(lCumcnt with th..: comp::my
name or tnisl name and individual's name on th~
document showing that they arc connected to the
commmv or Trust ond have the right to have the
vehi~le ~dcascd to them. Driver"s license, State
lll or passport will also be rl."quin:d for
iden11tica1ion All fei.:s have t\1 be paid prior IO
rclcasmg
Note: lmurance agl!nls may only inspt!ct i·d,ides,
not remm•e property fro,11 t/1e11t

An Impound I.ot Inspection and Property R<>lea,;c
fonn must he presented 10 the 1mr,our~d lot personnel
IO gain access to a vch1de stored m the lot
Issuing Impound Lot Inspection 11nd Property

Release Forms
A separate lmr-ound Lot lnspec:ion and Pro;,ert;
Release form must be issued for each vch1ck.
each time ii 1.'; inspected or searched
(E.i,.ccption 'lb: Aulu Thell Sergeant may use
one form to eain nccess to the lot for the purpose
of verifying- vehicle idcnulication numbers ot~
several cars )
Vehicles with H,,lds
Detectives from this
Department or DEA Metro, may authon1.c the
release of itemized property usmg the Impound
Lot Inspection and 1>ropcrty Release Forms

Vehicles without Holds
SI.CPD Oniccrs,
officers from outside agencies. ,chicle owners
and any C>thcr person authorized by this policy
mav obtain authortlallon forms via the Scr,·1ce
Dc;k 01 the lmpC1und Coonlinato,
fkforc issuing a form. any Hold on the vehicle
must he cleared through the follow-up officer or
the follow•up officer's supervisor. Officers from
this Department or DEA Mc1ro should give
vehick owners, officers. agents or othi.:r
repres..:n1a11vcs spcc1 lie instruction for cleuring
llolds.
Afi..:r hours. emergency property rdcascs may be
authorized by the on-duty \Vatch Commander
Property which may be authorized for release
shall be lirmtcd to the personal property
contained within the vehicle, but nm attached to
the vehicle or considered to he pan of the
vehicle's c41uipment (1c. stereos. whcds. etc)

lmpoundLMPe~onncl

•

Only persons w11h a valid Impound Lot
lnspcctmn and Property Release form will be
given access to impounded vehicles.
lhc unpound l0t attcmdant should. whenever
possible, accompany the rcqucs1111g pany during
inspection of the ,chicle
Property removed from u vchiclc must be
verilied against the Impound Lot lnspcclton and
Properly Release form The vd1iclL· owner or
representative may only retrieve items itemized
on the release form unless the release is for
personal property and the Impound Lot
personnel will ltst th..: items removed on tlu•
iorm. The Impound lot person will have the
person rec..:iving the property vcnfy the accuracy
of the propeny list.
Oilin~rs rcmnvmg add1t1011al propeny mu~t
itemiie the property and its d1spos1tion on the
form.
The impound lot nucr.dant will retain the original
copy of the form and return the yellow copy ID
the Impound Coord111ator.
Th..: Impound
Coordmntor will attach the yello\\ copy to the
casl' to be filed for 3 years

Officers Removmg Prnrerty· Officers removing
property for evidence must observe accepted search
and sei,ure practices Any evidence removed mu!>t
be described in additional narrnt1vc and
prop..:rty/cv1dcnce entry

Ii
I
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Vehicle Relocations

@

Relocations arc a courtesy to the vehicle ownt!r.
Illegally parked vehicles should be dealt with
according to State law or City ordinance and
Department policy regarding impounds. In some
circumstances, it may be appropriate for an officer to
have a legally parked. unattended vehicle relocated to
another parking place.
Officers may arrange for the relocation of vehicles at
the request of other Cily departments. Oflicers will
explain to those rcprescnta1ivcs from other City
depanmenLo; that the relocation will be at the expense
of that department. Vehicles will be relocated to the
nearest legal parking place as the situation dictates.
Only those towing companies specified by
cxmtractual agreement with the City will be used to
relocate vehicles.
Officers will notify Dispatch of the description,
license plate and the location of the relocated vehicle
and the reason for relocating the vehicle. This
information will be documented in the RMS.
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CHAPTER3

6.

RULES OF THE ROAD
SPEED
In Utah, there is the "Basic Speed Law" which states
that you may never drive faster than is reasonably
safe. However, when there is no sign, and where no
special hazards exist. the following speeds are permitted:

SPEED
LIMIT

20
SPEED
LIMIT

25
SPEED
LIMIT

55

20 miles per hour 1.When passing a school building or
grounds during school recess.
2.While children are going to or leaving
school during opening or closing hours
or when flashing lights are operating.

25 miles per hour - In any business or
residential area.

55 miles per hour - On major highways,
as posted.

7.
8.
9.

During poor weather conditions. Driving on an icy
road at 10 miles per hour or driving on an open
highway on a rainy night at 25 miles per hour may
be too fast.
Any time when you cannot see clearly.
In any highway work zones where construction,
maintenance, or utility work is being done.
When approaching any authorized vehicle which is
flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights.

On the other hand, do not drive so slowly that you
become a source of danger on the road. Traffic officers are allowed to issue you a citation if you are impeding the normal flow of traffic.
SIGNALING
~ignals shall be given by the use of turn signals, stoplights, or your hand and arm. Good drivers always signal their intentions well in advance. Signals are required:
1. For two seconds before turning.
2. For two seconds before beginning any lane
change.
3. Any time you pull away from a curb.
4. When you intend to slow down or stop. Your brake
lights will accomplish this if they are operating
properly and can readily be seen.
5. In addition, most cars have an emergency flasher
system for use when your car is disabled on the
highway. Use it.
Hand Signals for Stops and Turns

SPEED
LIMIT

65
SPEED
LIMIT

75
SPEED
LIMIT

65n5/80 miles per hour - On rural inter
state highways. Because Nrural" interstate
is defined by census boundaries, it may
be confusing to know which areas are 65
mph, which are 75 mph, and which are 80
mph. •1 thought this was a 75 mph zone" is
not a valid response if you are pulled over.
Remember, only when posted on inter
state highways is 65, 75, or 80 mph
allowed. The 6Sn5/80 mph transition
zones In Utah are indicated with pavement markings and additional signs.

80
In addition to the above speed limits, there are times
when the law requires that you slow down. Some of
those times include:
1. When approaching and crossing an intersection or
railroad crossing.
2. When approaching and going around a curve.
3. When approaching the top of a hill.
4. When traveling upon any narrow or winding road.
5. When special hazards such as people walking
beside the road, heavy traffic, or dangerous road
conditions exist.

12.
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BACKING
Be especially careful when backing. Keep your vehicle
on the right-hand side of the road and do not back unnec~ssarily long distances. Make sure the way behind
you 1s clear before you start backing. Do not interfere
with other traffic on the highway. Always turn your head
and look to the rear while backing. Do not back up on a
freeway or interstate.

PROPER USE OF LANES
As our Utah road system becomes more complex, the
proper use of lanes becomes increasingly important.
You should be aware of the laws concerning turns,
lane changes, overtaking, and passing.

Whenever you are changing lanes or passing, it will be
necessary for you to completely exit your current lane
of travel and enter the next lane.
Turns
A driver cannot safely operate a vehicle if he/she does
not know how to make proper turns. In general, a good
turn involves:
1. Making up your mind before you get to the turning
point.
2. Signaling and safely moving into the proper lane
well in advance of your turn. If you cannot get into
the proper lane al least 100 feet before your turn,
do not turn.
3. Giving the proper turn signal at least two seconds
before reaching the point where you plan to turn.
4. Slowing down to a reasonable turning speed.
5. Making the turn properly. The following instructions and illustrations will help you make proper
turns.
(Remember, a person may not operate a vehicle
over, across, or within any part of an island).
How to Make a Left Turn
1. Well before reaching the corner, signal your intention to change lanes, make a head check to the
left, and move into the left lane.
2. Start slowing down, and turn on the left turn signal
at least two seconds before reaching the point
where you wish to turn.
3. Look to the right and lo the left before starting to
make your turn.
4. Do not start turning until on-coming lanes are
clear.
5. Enter the street onto which you are turning just to
the right of the centerline.
6. Do not turn from or enter into the right hand lane.
7. Left turns may be made on a highway across double yellow line pavement markings indicating a two
direction, no-passing zone.
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How to Make a Righi Turn
1. Well before reaching the corner, signal your intention to change lanes, make a head check to the
right, and move into the right lane.
2. Start slowing down, and turn on the right turn signal at least two seconds before reaching the corner.
3. Look in both directions before you start to make
your turn.
4. Keep as close to the right as possible.
Turn From a Two-way Street onto a On e-way Street
and From a One-way Street onto a Two-way Street
You may turn left onto a one-way street from a oneway street on a red light after first coming to a complete stop.
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Roundabouts
Roundabouts were created in an effort to reduce the
number of points where conflict can occur between
vehicles and other vehicles or pedestrians. A roundabout has 12 potential points of conflict compared to 56
potential points of conflict at a regular "4-leg· intersection. A typical roundabout has a mountable curb
around the outside of the center island to accommodate big trucks and semis as necessary.
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Regular "4-leg" intersection
With 56 potential points of conflict
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The procedure for making a three-point turn is as follows:
1. Signal right
2. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
3. Pull over to the right side of the roadway
4. Signal left
5. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
6. Pull to the left over the oncoming travel lane
7. Stop and shift into reverse
8. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
9. Turn the wheels to the right and back slowly
across the roadway
10. Stop and shift into forward gear
11. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
12. Pull forward into the travel lane
Roundabout
With 12 potential points of conflict
There are four (4) points to remember when using a
roundabout: 1) always yield to the traffic that is already
in the roundabout; 2) roundabouts run counter clockwise, always enter the roundabout to your right; 3) always yield to pedestrians; and 4) always signal to the
right when exiting out of a roundabout.
The roundabout is a free flowing traffic lane; therefore,
it is not regulated by traffic lights. It is extremely important for the driver to be aware of pedestrians that
might be crossing the traffic lanes of a roundabout.
Two-Point Turns and Three-Point Turns
Two-point turns and three-point turns are maneuvers
that can be used when it is necessary to turn a vehicle
around on a roadway and there is not enough room
available to complete a U-Turn.
The procedure for making a two-point turn is as follows:
1. Signal a left turn
2. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
3. Pull to the left into the driveway
4. Stop and shift into reverse
5. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians
6. Turn the steering wheel to the right
7. Back out of the driveway and into the proper lane
8. Stop, shift into gear, and move forward

3 POINT TURN
U-Turns
You must never make a U-turn:
D On any curve.
D Near the top of a hill where you cannot see or be
seen from both directions for 500 feet.
D Where prohibited by an official traffic control device.
D On a railroad track or railroad grade crossing.
0 On a freeway
Each city has its own law concerning U-turns. Be sure
you know the specific law of the city in which you are
driving. A U-turn should only be made on a street or
highway which is sufficiently wide enough to allow a
tum to be made from the left hand lane or just right of
the center line or center of the street.
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2 POINT TURN
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on a multi-lane
Two Way Road With
Shared Tum Lane

2
On a multi-lane
Two Way Road

3

On a Two-lane
Two Way Road
without Lane
Markings

OVERTAKING AND PASSING

4

5

On a Two-Lane

At Intersections

_J

L

Two Way Road

Changing Lanes
Many drivers feel that using only their mirrors to check
for other traffic is adequate for changing lanes. The
illustration below shows some "blind spots" which cannot be seen when using your mirrors. Drivers who fail
to check these areas by looking over their shoulders cause many crashes.

If you desire to pass another vehicle, do it safely and
follow these suggestions:
1. Maintain a proper following distance as you approach the vehicle you intend to pass. A way to
determine the proper following distance is to use
the "two second rule" which means it should take
your car at least two seconds to reach the spot
that the car ahead of you just passed. You may
need to give yourself a "four second or more"
cushion if you are driving on slippery roads, following a motorcycle, pulling a trailer, or following large
vehicles.
2. Give proper signals.
3. Change lanes carefully. Do not forget to check
your blind spots. If you are driving on a two-lane
highway, do not start to pass if you cannot return
to your side of the road safely.
NOTE: When passing, move completely into the
left lane.
4.
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To help avoid crashes caused by dangerous lane
changes, we suggest that you practice the following
simple rules:
1. Glance in your rearview mirrors. Be certain that no
one is preparing to pass you.
2. Look over your shoulder in the direction you want
to move. Be sure no one is near the left or right
rear corners of your vehicle. These areas are
"blind spots." To see the "blind spots," you have to
turn your head and look.
3. Check quickly. Do not take your eyes off of the
road ahead of you for more than an instant. The
vehicle ahead of you could stop suddenly while
you are checking over your shoulder.
4. Drive defensively by making sure your lane
change can be completed safely. Be aware of the
movements of all vehicles around you.
5. Whenever possible, maintain your speed when
changing lanes. A driver who frequently speeds up
or slows down creates a dangerous situation for all
drivers on the road.
6. Try to help those drivers who check only their mirrors when they change lanes. One way to do that
is to avoid driving in their "blind spots."

After passing and before returning to the proper
lane, check your blind spot again. Make sure there
is plenty of room between you and the car you
have just passed. Avoid cutting in too quickly. A
good rule is to wait until the vehicle you have just
passed can be seen in your inside rearview mirror.
On a highway with two-way traffic, get back to the
right-hand side of the road before coming within
200 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction .
You must yield the left lane on a multiple lane
highway to vehicles approaching you from the
rear.

A new Utah law allows you to pass a bicycle or moped
proceeding in the same direction left of the center lane
if the bicycle or moped is travelling at a speed less
than the reasonable speed. Including, passing in a no
passing zone, if it is safe to do so.
There are only two times when you may pass to the
right of another vehicle. They are shown in the illustrations below.
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On a two-lane road when
the vehicle you are
passing is about to tum left

On a highway with at least
two lanes of traffic moving
in the same direction
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Remember, il is illegal to leave the roadway when
passing on the ri ght.
At all other times you must pass to the left. The following illustrations show situations when you may not
pass.
DO NOT PASS OR CHANGE LANES
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Over double yellow lines
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When solid yellow
line is in your lane

DO NOT PASS
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When approaching or while
crossing a railroad crossing

When approaching within
100 feel of crossing an
intersection
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In the lwo-way left turn lane (shared turn lane)
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Another car which has
stopped at a crosswalk

•
On hills

On curves

•
When school bus lights
are flashing
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When approaching any
bridge, viaduct, or tunnel

Passing in a no passi ng zone is legal if you are passing a bicycle or moped traveling in the same direction
as you are al a speed that is slower than the reasonable speed of traffic if the pass can be made safely.
MERGING AND GORE AREA
If you are merging into a lane of traffic, you must yield
the right-of-way lo all vehicles traveling the continuing
lane of traffic and which are close enough to be an
immediate threat. It is against the law to cross over or
to drive in the "gore area." The gore area is between
the white solid lines of a lane of traffic and a lane used
lo either enter or exit from that traffic lane. The gore
area can also appear when two highways merge or
split. Do not cross over the solid white lines.

RIGHT-OF-WAY
The other driver may be required to yield the right-ofway to you, but do not let your life depend on it. It is
more important to avoid crashes than to insist on your
right-of-way. The following are some rules to follow
which will help you avoid a crash and could possibly
save your life or the lives of others.

Emergency Vehicles
When police cars, fire engines, ambulances, or other
emergency vehicles approach using sirens, emergency lights, or other warning devices, you MUST YIELD
the right-of-way. DRIVE AT ONCE TO THE RIGHT
SIDE OF THE ROAD AND STOP until the emergency
vehicle has passed.

Intersections (4-way stops)
If you arrive at an intersection at approximately the
same time as vehicles from different directions, the
driver on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right. For example, the intersection in the
illustration below is controlled by four stop signs. Car A
yields to car B because car B is on the right.

Unless you are on official business, do not follow within 500 feet of any fire vehicle responding to an alarm.
You may not drive or park on the same block where
the fire vehicle has stopped to answer an alarm.

' A

If you are in an intersection and want to turn left, you
must yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction. After yielding, you may turn
left if it is safe to do so. In the situation shown below,
car B must yield to car A.

NOTE: When approaching a stationary emergency
vehicle with fl ash ing lights, you must reduce your
speed , provide as much space as practical to th e
emergency vehicle, and if practical and it is safe to
do so, make a lane change into a lane away from
the emergency vehicle.
If you are convicted for NOT making a lane change
or slowing down when approaching a stopped
emergency vehicle, you must attend a four (4) hour
live classroom defensive driving course within 90
days of conviction. If you fail to attend the defensive driving class, your license wil l be suspended
for 90 days .
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COURTESY IS THE KEY TO SAFETY
You must yield to vehicles from a different roadway if
your corner is controlled by stop signs, yield signs. or
red lights. In the illustration below. car A must yield to
car B since the corner for car A is controlled by a stop
sign.

Pedestrians
If a pedestrian is crossing the street in a "marked" or
"unmarked" crosswalk, you must yield the right-of-way
to the pedestrian when the pedestrian is upon the half
of the roadway upon which your vehicle is traveling.
Drivers must also yield when a pedestrian approaching from the opposite side of the roadway is close to
the center of the roadway. In addition, any vehicle
crossing a sidewalk must yield to all traffic on the sidewalk. In the illustration below, the area from where
sidewalk "A" ends and sidewalk "B" begins is a legal
crosswalk, even though there are no painted lines. For
this reason, it is called an "unmarked crosswalk."
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STOPPING
Many people seem to feel that a "rolling stop" is adequate when they are required to stop. The following
situations are times when you must make a complete
stop:
1. At a steady (non-nashing) red light or at a flashing
red light.
2. At all stop signs .
3. At railroad crossings controlled by nashing signals, gates, a watchman, or stop signs. Stop more
than 15 feel (but not more than 50 feet) away
from the nearest rail until it is safe to continue. If
there is a gale, wait for it to be raised.
4. If a school bus is displaying alternating nashing
red light signals visible from the front or rear. Stop
immediately before reaching the bus. Do not proceed until the flashing red light signal ceases
to stop. IF YOU ARE:
a. Traveling on a divided highway having four or
more lanes with a median separating the
traffic, it is only necessary for the vehicles
traveling in both lanes behind the school bus
to stop, and not the traffic traveling in the
opposite direction.
b. Traveling on a two-lane roadway, traffic in
both directions is required to stop.
c. Traveling on a four-lane roadway without a
median, traffic in both directions is required to
slop.
d. Traveling on a highway having five or more
lanes and having a shared center turn lane, it
is only required for the vehicle in both lanes
behind the school bus to come to a complete
stop. Vehicles traveling in the opposite direction are not legally required to stop.

Two Lanes
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Thre e or more Lanes, no spear.it ion

It is important to note that although you may not be
required by law to stop when you see a stopped school
bus, you should be aware that students will be getting
on and off the bus. Children are unpredictable and
could run into the road at any lime. Use caution as you
are driving near school buses and adjust your speed
accordingly.
NOTE: School bus drivers may r eport vehicles that
improperly pass school buses . The report may be
forwarded to th e local law enforcemen t agency for
investigation. Fin es range from $100 to S500; and
remember, a conviction for passing a school bus
illegally usually means an increase in insurance
rates.
5.
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At the scene of any crash in which you may be
involved as a driver. You must meet all legal requirements before you may leave the crash scene.
When a police or other peace officer requests you
to stop.
Prior to a sidewalk area, or street, when coming
onto a street or highway from an alley, private
driveway, private road, or from a building.

PARKING
In the interest of public safety, there are several places
where you are not allowed lo park. These places include:
1. On a sidewalk.
2. In front of a public or private driveway.
3. In an intersection.
4. Within 15 feet of a fire hydrant.
5. On a crosswalk.
6. Within 20 feet of a crosswalk.
7. Within 30 feet of any flashing beacon, stop sign,
yield sign, or traffic control signal.
8. In an area which is posted for pedestrian use or
within 30 feet of the edges of that area.
9. On any railroad track or within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing.
10. Within 20 feel of the driveway entrance to any fire
station. Also, if signs are posted, you may not park
on the opposite side of the road if you are within
75 feet of the fire station entrance.
11 . Alongside or opposite any street excavation or
obstruction when stopping or parking would block
traffic.
12. On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or
parked at the edge or curb of a street (this means
that you cannot double park).
13. On any bridge or other elevated highway structure
or in a highway tunnel.
14. At any place where official signs prohibit stopping.
15. On the shoulder of any interstate highway. These
areas may be used only if your vehicle breaks
down or you are in physical distress.
16. Red painted curbs or red zones.

Many drivers avoid parallel parking or parking on a hill.
You can increase your driving abilities and convenience by learning those skills.
PARKING ON A HILL
1. If you are parking uphill beside a curb, turn your
front wheels away from the curb and let your car
roll back so that the front tire touches the curb.
2.. Never leave your vehicle until you have set the
emergency brake, stopped the motor, removed
the ignition key, and locked the doors.
3. Pull as far off the road as reasonable to park. If
parking next to a curb, the back wheel of your car
must be no further than 12 inches away from the
curb.
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HIGHWAY WORK ZONES
Highway work zones are those portions of a street or
highway where construction, maintenance or utility
work is being done to the road, its shoulders, or any
other items related to the roadway. This includes work
such as underground and overhead utility work, tree
trimming, and surveying activities. Highway work
zones are easily recognized by the presence of orange
signing and other orange traffic control devices, flashing lights on equipment, and workers dressed in highly
visible clothing.
Each year nearly a thousand people are killed and
thousands are injured as a result of crashes in highway work zones. Some of these are highway workers,
naggers, or law enforcement officials. However, over
80% of the fatalities and injuries are suffered by drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. Many of these work
zone crashes are preventable.

1
Turn Wh ee ls
T o Curb
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If your parking would block the flow of traffic, find
another place to park.
If you are parked outside a business or residential
area, your vehicle must be clearly seen from 200
feet in each direction.
A courteous driver never parks too close to another car. Parking too close to another car could result in damage to your car.

PARALLEL PARKING
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NOTE: Double Fines: The courts are required to
fine a driver who speeds in a highway construction
zone at least twice t he amount of the regular fine
for speeding.
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Highway workers are trained on how to set up safe
work zones with directional traffic signs and devices.
Motorists and pedestrians are responsible for knowing
how to read and react to these directions. Paying attention and driving cautiously and courteously are the
most important steps in preventing crashes while driving through highway work zones.
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Wheels adjJcenl lo curb musl nol be more than 12 inches from lhe curb.

Driving Tips
Signing, traffic control devices, roadway markings,
naggers, and law enforcement officers are used to
protect highway workers and direct drivers safely
through work zones or along carefully marked detours.
In many work zone situations, normal speed limits may
be reduced for safety reasons. These reduced speed
limits are clearly posted within the work zone. If there
are no reduced speed limit postings, drivers should
obey the normal posted speed limit, but continue to be
alert and prepared for the unexpected.
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When you travel through a work zone, remember
these three tips:
Adjust your speed to conditions.
Adjust your lane position away from workers
and equipment.
O Prepare for the unexpected.
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Road Work Signs
Construction signs are used to notify drivers of unusual
or potentially dangerous conditions on or near the traveled way. All temporary signs in work zones have an
orange background and black letters or symbols. Most
of these signs are diamond shaped, although some are
rectangular.

Because of their traveling speed and size, construction
and repair equipment can 'present an unusual condition to motorists and pedestrians. It is important to
note that equipmen t operators do not have the
same abilit y to see around t heir vehi cles as most
drivers do. This makes it important for drivers and
pedestrians to give them extra room and be prepared
for the unexpected.

Night Work Zones
More and more roadway work is being completed after
dark. In many situations, night work is the better alternative to restricting daytime use of the roadway, primarily to relieve traffic congestion for motorists.
The hazards of driving through highway work zones
are increased at night. Use extreme caution when driving through night work zones.
Fl aggers Instructions
Flaggers and law enforcement officers are often ~sed
to give specific directions in work zones. Drivers
should slow down and use extreme caution when approaching a flagger or officer. Follow all directions_given by the nagger or officer. Failure to observe directions given by a nagger or officer may result in a citation.
Work Zone Traffic Con trol Devices
Highway work zones are set up according to the type
of road and the work to be done on the road. Various
traffic control devices are used in construction, maintenance and work areas to direct drivers and pedestrians safely through or around the work zone and provide for the safety of the highway workers. The most
commonly used traffic control devices are signs, barricades, drums, cones, tubes, and flashing arrow panels. The basic color used for most of these devices is
orange.

Chapter 3 Sample Test Questions
1. True or False
You may not park with-in 25 feet of a crosswalk.
2. True or False
If you are convicted for NOT making a lane change or
slowing down when approaching a stopped emergency
vehicle, you must attend a four (4) hour live classroom
defensive driving course within 90 days of conviction.
3. It is permissible to drive on the left half of the roadway:
A. To reach a parking space on the other side of the
road.
B. When crossing a railroad track.
C. When passing a vehicle going the same direction
on a two-lane road with sufficient clearance.
4. True or False
There may be times when driving 10 miles per hour is
too fast for existing conditions.
5. You cannot legally park with in _ __ feet of a stop
sign.
A. 15

B. 20
C. 30

•

Answers
1. False: 2. True: 3. C: 4. True: 5. C
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